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Supranational regulatory agencies
between independence and control:
the EMEA and the authorization of
pharmaceuticals in the European
Single Market
Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Krapohl
ABSTRACT The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) represents a new type of
supranational regulation. Formally, it merely advises the Commission and a member
state committee on the authorization of pharmaceuticals. In practice, however, it
dominates decision-making and operates much like an independent agency. Based
upon a brief discussion of the merits of independent regulation and the necessity
to control regulatory activities, the article explores the institutional arrangement in
which the EMEA is embedded and seeks to explain how tight oversight is compatible
with quasi-independent action. It argues that the multi-tiered oversight mechanism
restricts the non-scientific actors involved in the authorization of pharmaceuticals
more than the agency – as long as the agency adheres to its mandate of producing
scientifically convincing decisions.
KEY WORDS Delegation; EMEA; pharmaceuticals; regulatory agencies; Single
Market regulation
1. INTRODUCTION
The relevance and nature of delegation for supranational governance within the
European Union (EU) is increasingly explored by scholars of European
integration. Whereas decision-making powers are predominantly delegated to
the well-known supranational institutions, especially the Commission and the
Court (Alter 1998; Pollack 2003), some regulatory tasks are assigned to separ-
ately established agencies. Generally, such delegation is subject to the tension
between independent decision-making and close oversight. On the one hand,
modern regulation theory demonstrates that regulatory decisions will
improve, if intervention of actors with particularistic interests is precluded
and agencies act as fiduciaries of the long-term interests of their principals
with a considerable margin of discretion at their disposal (Majone 2001a,
2001b; Cukierman 1994). Hence, the degree of formal independence from gov-
ernment and parliamentary majorities ranks high in the appraisal of regulatory
agencies (Gilardi 2002; Thatcher 2002). On the other hand, mainstream
Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online# 2007 Taylor & Francis
http:==www.tandf.co.uk=journals
DOI: 10.1080=13501760601122407
Journal of European Public Policy 14:2 March 2007: 208–226
principal–agent theory emphasizes that regulatory agencies must be forced to
follow their principals’ interests (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Pollack
2003), because as newly created actors they might otherwise pursue their
own agendas.
This article examines how formal or informal independence is accommo-
dated with oversight of decision-making activities within the European auth-
orization system for pharmaceuticals. The European Medicines Agency
(formerly the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products,
EMEA), which constitutes the cornerstone of the system, is among the most
important supranational regulatory agencies founded in the EU during the
last decade (Kelemen 2002; Krapohl 2004). It enjoys remarkably far-reaching
competencies (Majone 1997) and may be conceived of as a blueprint for
future agencies announced in the Commission White Paper on European
Governance (COM 2001 [428] final). Although the agency did not acquire
formal independence, it dominates the decision-making process for the auth-
orization of medicinal products in the Single Market and virtually determines
the content of authorization decisions, because it is well protected from inter-
ventions in its day-to-day decision-making by the member states and other
political actors.
The implications of the institutional arrangement for the authorization of
pharmaceuticals are increasingly heavily disputed among observers. Most contri-
butions focus on the origins of the authorization system and correctly point out
that it has been promoted by industry within the Single Market project, rather
than by stakeholders with public health interests (Lewis and Abraham 2001:
62–5; Permanand and Mossialos 2005: 697–700). However, this does not elu-
cidate how the tension between the demand for a science-based operation of the
EMEA and the demand for its oversight is solved within the existing arrange-
ment. Scholars focusing on the formal position of the member states and
their domestic authorization administrations conclude that the member states
refrained from giving up their control of the decision process (Kelemen
2002). Others argue that the quasi-independence of the agency supports the
quality of regulatory decision-making (e.g. Majone and Everson 2001; Vogel
1998), and yet others, taking agency independence for granted, criticize the
arrangement because of its lack of effective control which might foster a neo-
corporatist bias in favour of industry interests (e.g. Abraham and Lewis 2000:
147–71). Despite this critique, an extensive opinion survey conducted in
2001 on behalf of the Commission showed that most stakeholders support
the centralized authorization procedure and appreciate the work of the
EMEA. Over 90 per cent of the applying companies and all regulatory
authorities of the then fifteen member states expressed their satisfaction with
the procedure, while the two principal consumer groups – physicians and
patients – were only slightly less positive (Cameron McKenna and Anderson
Consulting 2001: 72–6). Moreover, the European system for the authorization
of pharmaceuticals has been reinforced recently (by Regulation [EC] 726/2004,
OJ No. L 136 of 30.4.2004; see Feick 2005).
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The article starts with a brief discussion of the benefits of regulation by
independent agencies and explores oversight mechanisms which do not under-
mine the ability of the agency to produce reasonable regulatory decisions
(section 2). Against this backdrop, it examines the operation of the European
authorization system for pharmaceuticals with a particular view to the origins
of the de facto independence of the EMEA and the mechanisms established
for its control. It demonstrates that the multi-tiered oversight mechanism
commits the EMEA, and all other actors involved-including the member
states-to a rule-based decision-making process, which strictly limits the
margin for opportunistic manoeuvre of all relevant actors (section 3). The
article concludes that the complex oversight mechanism restricts the non-
scientific actors involved in the authorization of pharmaceuticals more than
the agency – as long as the agency adheres to its mandate of producing
scientifically convincing decisions.
2. REGULATION BY INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Recent theoretical work has pointed out that delegation follows two different
logics, rather than a single one (Majone 2001a; Franchino 2002). On the one
hand, a principal may desire to reduce transaction costs and mobilize executive
branch expertise, so that the agent should, generally, decide as the principal
would have done. On the other hand, a principal may delegate decision-
making competencies to enhance the credibility of policy commitments, so
that an agent is expected to decide differently from what the principal would
have done. Whereas the former approach emphasizes control and oversight of
the agent, the latter focuses upon its independence. In this section, we
explore how the two approaches can be fruitfully combined.
2.1 The case for independence of regulatory agencies
Among the most important reasons for the delegation of regulatory functions to
an independent agency ranks the problem of time-inconsistent preferences of
one or more principals. As long as an actor is aware of his interests, and his pre-
ferences are consistent, he can usually act accordingly. Agents established for his
assistance may be closely controlled because the agents are supposed to do exactly
what the principal would have done himself. However, in many cases long-term
interests militate against situation-specific short-term preferences (Keech 1995:
38–40), so that action in the particular situation jeopardizes the pursuit of
long-term interests. A state or government faced with a case of hostage-taking
might tend to negotiate in order to save the lives of hostages, but the reputation
of negotiating will provide a strong incentive to incur future crimes.
Modern regulatory theory argues that independent agencies are better suited
for regulatory matters than tightly controlled state bureaucracies (e.g. Majone
and Everson 2001), because they remedy the problem of inconsistent
preferences (Cukierman 1994). To resist the temptation to act according to
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short-term preferences, an actor must sacrifice his discretion in the concrete
situation and bind himself by an appropriate institutional restraint to a suitable
‘mast’ like Ulysses did in light of the Sirens. If he assigns implementing decisions
to an agent unsusceptible to the temptations of specific situations, he will create
a ‘credible commitment’ (Shepsle 1991), which binds himself as well as his suc-
cessors. It is important that such an agent is able to act differently from what the
principal would have done in his place – not as his slave, but as his ‘fiduciary’
(Majone 2001b).
Authorization of pharmaceuticals raises the problem of inconsistent prefer-
ences over time. Clinical testing of pharmaceuticals is extremely expensive
and producers might depend economically on the authorization of a particular
product. Patients might eagerly await authorization of a pharmaceutical which
promises to cure a dangerous disease. Hence, decision-makers may be under
considerable pressure from interest groups and single applicants to decide
according to the particularities of the specific situation. However, pharmaceuti-
cals can be extremely harmful. Not only are biologically or chemically highly
active substances deliberately incorporated, consumers will also usually be
unable to judge the quality of medicinal products themselves, so that infor-
mation is typically asymmetrically distributed between producers and consu-
mers (Feick 2000). The regulation of these products according to reliable and
comparatively strict standards may be assumed to be in the long-term interest
of society, because both consumers and producers benefit from a well-operating
market.
Within the European Single Market, authorization of pharmaceuticals raises
the additional problem of market integration. Generally, member states may be
assumed to have an interest in market integration, allowing an accelerated recov-
ery of the enormous development costs of modern pharmaceuticals for the
benefit of industry (Lewis and Abraham 2001), but they might also be interested
in selectively protecting non-competitive domestic industries. Moreover, public
health matters remain located at the national level, so that the member states
assume responsibility for the safety of pharmaceuticals marketed under their
jurisdiction, whereas the task of opening originally protected markets for the
free exchange of pharmaceuticals is a typical matter for supranational regulation
(Permanand and Mossialos 2005: 688–90). If every member state seeks to rely
as far as possible on its own domestic authorization system, none can benefit
from market integration. Indeed, the traditional approach to an integrated
market for pharmaceuticals prior to the introduction of the new European
authorization scheme in 1993 proved to be a complete failure, because the
member states regularly refused to recognize authorizations issued by other
member states (Collatz 1996: 48; Gardner 1996: 52–5).
2.2 How to control an agency without jeopardizing its independence
Entrusting an independent agency with far-reaching competencies creates the
danger of ‘shirking’, and requires arrangements to make the agency accountable
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for its decisions. It is not self-evident that a fully independent agency produces
‘good’ decisions, because bureaucracies may well develop and pursue their own
interests, rather than those of their principals (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
They may also systematically prefer the perspectives of some stakeholders to
those of others. In the present case, the well-organized producers of pharmaceu-
ticals might manage to generate more effective pressure on a regulator than the
heterogeneous group of consumers of these products (Lewis and Abraham 2001:
62–73; Abraham and Lewis 2002: 78–82). The danger of shirking will
decrease, if an effective oversight system is installed to detect and possibly
sanction problematic regulatory decisions. According to standard principal–
agent theory, possible sanctioning instruments include the redefinition, in
extreme cases total withdrawal, of decision-making competencies, prescription
of administrative procedures (McCubbins et al. 1987), as well as the restriction
of budgetary resources (Huber 2000). Successful oversight does not necessarily
require explicit action because an agent may anticipate sanctions and adapt to
the principal’s expectations (Pollack 2003: 202).
Unfortunately, particularistic interests might come back into day-to-day
policy-making through direct sanctioning. The agent will not act within an
arm’s-length distance from the political sphere anymore, if its decisions are
directly overseen by its principal. Direct intervention might effectively stop a
regulatory system developing in a totally wrong direction, but it does not con-
stitute an appropriate instrument for the fine-tuning of regulation in the day-to-
day business (Gehring 2004: 690–2). Generally, more powerful sanctioning
capacities of the principal are prone to weaken credible commitment to long-
term policy objectives and reduce delegation gains (Tallberg 2002). Hence,
the central issue is to allow the agency the discretion necessary for the proper
discharge of its regulatory tasks, and to ensure at the same time that it does
not overstep its competencies (Majone 2001a: 119).
The trade-off between the desirability of independent regulatory decision-
making and the necessity of its tight control by the principal can be avoided
if oversight functions are assigned to another agent. The task of controlling
intended to minimize the dangers of ‘shirking’ and ‘capture’ of a regulatory
agency does not have to be carried out by the principal (Kiewiet andMcCubbins
1991: 33–4). Within the EU, control functions are frequently assigned to the
European Commission and, indirectly, to the European Court of Justice. In this
way, the original commitment of the principal to his long-term interest is not
undermined, because he does not himself intervene in the day-to-day decision
process. However, delegation of control functions raises the second-order
control problem of who guards the guardians (Shapiro 1988). If we can
expect agents to deviate from the principal’s long-term interests unless an
appropriate oversight system is in place, this will apply to agents fulfilling the
control function as well.
The trade-off can also be sidestepped, if the discretion of an agency is
constrained by substantive rules upon which decisions have to be based.
Substantive rules provide guidance before a regulatory decision is made
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(Huber et al. 2001). They constitute the most definitive set of instructions that
can be given to an agency with respect to the actions it must take during policy
implementation. If carefully elaborated, they reflect, and elucidate, the long-
term interests of the principal and inform the agency of the desired general
direction of regulatory decision-making. They also provide a yardstick against
which regulatory decisions adopted by the agency can be appraised ex post by
any competent actor; for example, by a court. For the agency, they create an
(implicit) requirement to ‘give reasons’ (Shapiro 1992) for its decisions, and
provide incentives for the elaboration of appropriate internal procedures
binding the agency to its commitments. In addition, the making of substantive
rules creates constraints for the principals. If he does not know his interests in all
future cases, because the mass of regulatory decisions is still unknown, he will
favour criteria which promise reasonable decisions, even if not fitting his (yet
unknown) parochial interests (Gehring 2004).
From the preceding discussion against the backdrop of the two competing
strands of principal–agent theory, we can derive two conditions for efficient
regulation against which the existing system for the authorization of pharmaceu-
ticals in the SingleMarket can be appraised. First, regulationwill bemost efficient
if the principals of the agency, namely the member states as well as the Commis-
sion and the European Parliament acting as the joint EU legislator, accept a
credible commitment which effectively precludes their intervention in the day-
to-day decision-making of the agency in order to avoid short-sighted decisions.
Second, the agency must be effectively prevented from sidestepping the task
assigned to it by its principals without reintroducing situation-specific consider-
ations in the decision process through the back door.
3. THE EMEA AND THE CENTRALIZED AUTHORIZATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS
The European authorization system for pharmaceuticals was established in 1993
(Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93, OJ No. L 214 of 24/8/1993) after mutual
recognition had failed to produce a single market for medicinal products. It
was revised in 2004 (Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004, OJ No. L 136 of 30/
4/2004), whereby its central features were retained and strengthened. It was
intended to establish a single European market for innovative, i.e. costly, phar-
maceuticals, not to advance European health policy, and the member states
retained full control of healthcare competencies, including budgets and drug
prices. Thus, regulation has to ensure that authorized pharmaceuticals are
reliable, rather than to enhance public health in Europe.
The centralized authorization procedure forms the centrepiece of the new
system and is thus best suited for an assessment of its operation. It applies to
all biotechnologically produced pharmaceuticals as well as products related to
certain diseases (e.g. diabetes, cancer, Alzheimer’s and AIDS), whereas other
innovative products can be voluntarily authorized under the procedure. Less
innovative products and generics, i.e. clones of already existing and authorized
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medicines, are authorized under the decentralized procedure based upon mutual
recognition of member state authorizations. But arbitration following the same
rules as the centralized authorization procedure will be started if mutual recog-
nition fails. Decision-making by the EMEA is not only affected by the multi-
step authorization procedure (3.1), but also by the existence of substantive
decision criteria and the highly developed system of European law (3.2), as
well as by remarkable guidelines adopted by the EMEA to ensure consistency
of its decisions that implicitly limit its room for opportunistic manoeuvre (3.3).
3.1 The first layer: checks and balances of the authorization procedure
The centralized authorization procedure establishes a system of differentiated
decision-making which allocates particular functions to the different stages
and actors involved. A producer submits its application to the EMEA, a
London-based entity separate from the regular European institutions with its
own budget, employees and director. An expert committee operating as part
of the agency and supported by its administration elaborates a scientific
opinion. Subsequently, the Commission transforms the opinion into a decision
proposal. The formal decision is eventually taken by the Standing Committee
for Human Medicinal Products, i.e. a Comitology committee in which the
member states are represented. In case of conflict, decisions are referred to the
Council. Hence, at least three actors, i.e. the EMEA, the Commission and
the Standing Committee, are necessarily involved in every single authorization
decision. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.
At first glance, the authorization procedure seems to be dominated by the
member states and the Commission. No authorization decision can be
adopted without the agreement of the Commission and the Standing Commit-
tee. Originally, the Committee operated according to the regulatory procedure,
which provides that a proposal is referred to the Council, unless it is endorsed by
a qualified majority of member states’ votes. Later on, the management pro-
cedure was introduced according to which a Commission proposal can be
blocked by a qualified majority of votes. Moreover, an authorization formally
constitutes a Commission decision, so that the Commission, and not the
EMEA, is legally accountable for it. In contrast, the agency appears to enjoy a
Figure 1 Centralized authorization procedure for pharmaceuticals
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comparatively weak formal status within the procedure. Since it is merely
assigned the task of evaluating applications for the authorization of pharmaceu-
ticals and of recommending decisions, it might appear to be a somewhat over-
sized scientific advisory committee fulfilling the function of a conditional
agenda-setter in collaboration with the Commission (Tsebelis 1994). The
strong formal control component is apparently designed to prevent the
agency from ignoring the principal’s interests. The member states lost their indi-
vidual veto powers when the original system based upon mutual recognition of
national authorizations was abolished. In addition, the European Court of
Justice had, with its Meroni doctrine, closed the door for the extensive del-
egation of formal decision-making competencies to entities not empowered
by the European treaties (Vos 1999: 200).
On closer inspection, the balance between the importance of scientific
advisory functions and political control functions is almost completely reversed.
The EMEA dominates the authorization procedure, while political control is
almost negligible in practice. The strength of the agency originates from
several sources which altogether reinforce its position as an agenda-setter for
the ensuing decision stages and make it very difficult for the other actors
involved to ignore its scientific opinions.
In contrast to regular scientific committees within the EU, involvement of
the EMEA cannot be sidestepped. Producers apply for a marketing authoriz-
ation directly at the EMEA and not at the Commission. Accordingly, the
agency is not only always involved in the authorization process. It also operates
at the first stage of the decision-making process and its scientific opinions
inevitably set the agenda for subsequent decision stages. This is in sharp contrast
to the traditional committee system, where the Commission enjoys the true
agenda-setting power, because it is almost free to consult the expertise of
scientific committees at will (Krapohl 2003).
Scientific opinions on applications are elaborated by an institutionalized
network of experts from member state regulatory agencies within the Commit-
tee for Human Medicinal Products (CHMP; formerly the Committee for Pro-
prietary Medicinal Products, CPMP). The members of this committee act in a
personal capacity and are recruited preferably from the regulatory agencies of the
member states which usually themselves act at arm’s length from direct political
intervention in their day-to-day business. This institutional arrangement implies
that a draft opinion is scrutinized from the perspectives of a variety of different
national regulatory cultures before being adopted or amended, so that decisions
agreed upon within the committee are acceptable from the perspectives of at
least a majority of domestic regulatory agencies. Decisions adopted within the
EMEA will usually be difficult for the member states to challenge for scientific
reasons, because their own expert administrations are closely involved in their
elaboration and will not complain about a particular decision, unless it is con-
sidered as grossly unconvincing by an outvoted representative. The decision
process is supported by the fact that committee members, especially the two rap-
porteurs preparing a draft scientific opinion, can draw upon the apparatuses of
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their national regulatory agencies to process the overwhelming amount of
information included in an average application of some 250,000 pages (inter-
views at EMEA headquarters and at the German pharmaceutical authority
[Bundesamt fu¨r Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte]). Altogether, the appraisal
of applications relies on a network of member state regulatory agencies
(Dehousse 1997; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Majone 1997) which is similar
to that of the European System of Central Banks.
Ironically, an EMEA expert committee composed of independent scientists
would probably weaken, rather than strengthen, the position of the EMEA
within the procedure. Originally, the European Parliament had struggled for
an expert committee composed of independent scientists (OJ C 183 of 15/7/
1991: 178), and in the recent reform process, it proposed selection of committee
members by the EMEA executive director from a list provided by the member
states (COM [2002] 735 final of 10/12/2002). In contrast to the current
system, committeemembers would bemore independent from the expert admin-
istrations of the member states. However, one person cannot handle the docu-
mentation of the several hundred thousand pages of which an application is
composed. Currently, the few non-regulators in the committee must rely on
the resources of their private institutes – which may be funded, directly or
indirectly, by the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, more independence from the
member states might lead to less independence from industries’ interests.
Alternatively, the EMEA, now basically an administrative support unit for the
expert committee, would have to expand its own scientific and technical
capacities dramatically. This step would necessarily entail a radical centralization
of the regulatory system and would probably lead to more ex-post control of the
agency by the Commission and the member states represented in the Standing
Committee. Thus, more independence of the EMEA experts might lead to a
weaker EMEA within the decision-making procedure.
Formal restrictions diminish the role of the Commission and the Standing
Committee. The procedure provides strong incentives for the Commission to
stick to the scientific opinion prepared by the EMEA. Not only is it obliged
to justify a possible deviation from the EMEA opinion according to the rules
of the authorization procedure (Gardner 1996: 56). In the case of scientific
doubt, it cannot itself amend, or ignore, the opinion but must refer the
matter back to the EMEA, where it is examined again by the expert committee.
Decisive action within the Standing Committee is also restricted. The centra-
lized authorization procedure does not envisage that member states regularly
meet and discuss authorization decisions within the Standing Committee.
Except for special cases, decisions will be adopted in a written procedure
and are automatically passed if no member state objects within thirty days
(Vos 1999: 212–13).
In practice, both the Commission and the Standing Committee have
remained largely inactive over the last ten years. Not a single Commission pro-
posal submitted up to May 2001 deviated from the scientific opinion of the
EMEA expert committee (COM 2001 [404] final: 8–9) and the authors do
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not know of any such deviation in the time thereafter. The Commission does
not even make use of a separate scientific apparatus to scrutinize the EMEA
opinions. Consequently, the EMEA committee throughout determined the
content of decision proposals prepared by the Commission for the Standing
Committee. Likewise, the Standing Committee rarely decides anything actively
(ibid.). Out of 262 authorization decisions, 253 were adopted according to the
written procedure, and merely nine within regular meetings. Four of these nine
decisions received unanimous support, while only five were supported by a qua-
lified majority. Not a single decision proposal was eventually rejected by the
committee and none was referred to the Council. Consequently, every final
decision under the centralized authorization procedure reflects the relevant
scientific opinion of the EMEA committee (figures include the decisions accord-
ing to the arbitration procedure which operates exactly like the centralized
procedure).
What is formally designed as an oversight mechanism of the police patrol
type has in practice developed into a remote fire alarm system (McCubbins
and Schwartz 1987). According to the formal procedure, both the Commission
and the member states represented in the Standing Committee can examine
every authorization decision prior to its adoption. In practice, neither of the
oversight actors has established the necessary scientific apparatus for doing so.
Employment of their formally strong decision-making power will thus
depend on external alert. A ‘fire alarm’ may be raised in particular by an apply-
ing pharmaceutical company or by an outvoted member of the EMEA expert
committee. However, the far-reaching inactivity of this oversight system does
not imply that it is irrelevant for the authorization procedure (Pollack 2003:
202). It provides a permanent incentive for the EMEA expert committee to
elaborate convincing opinions against which no relevant actor can seriously
mobilize the oversight system. As a consequence, the EMEA virtually deter-
mines the content of authorization decisions, but it does so in the shadow of
threatened intervention by the Commission and/or the Standing Committee.
During the reform process, the member states refused to abolish this oversight
stage. Whereas the Commission advocated cutting back the last stage of the
authorization procedure (COM [2001] 404 final), because the formally power-
ful Standing Committee did not seem to fulfil any important function in prac-
tice, the member states merely accepted replacing the originally very restrictive
regulatory procedure by a management procedure (Regulation [EC] 726/2004,
arts. 10 and 87). Henceforth, the Standing Committee can block a decision by a
qualified majority of member states’ votes.
As a corollary to the inactivity of the political oversight system, the members
of the EMEA expert committee appear to refrain from bargaining and resort to
the elaboration of scientifically sound opinions. According to a survey con-
ducted by the authors, scientific opinions are almost always adopted by a con-
sensus of committee members. Of all together 242 opinions, issued from the
setting into force of the centralized authorization procedure in 1995 until the
end of 2002 and published by the EMEA on the Internet (www.emea.eu.int),
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only twenty-three were adopted by majority vote (Krapohl 2005: 119–30). If
committee members were predominantly attempting to pursue the parochial
interests of their member states and to resort to bargaining over individually pre-
ferred outcomes, we would expect that majorities might not hesitate to outvote
remaining minorities. Hence, the prevailing consensus may be interpreted as
indicating far-reaching substantive agreement with the decisions adopted by
the committee. Its members appear to be well aware of the importance of scien-
tifically reliable opinions for their collective reputation as an impartial scientific
body.
The remarkable difference between the inferior formal status of the EMEA and
its dominating actual position within the authorization process requires expla-
nation. In spite of its inferior status as an advisory body, the expert committee dom-
inates the authorization process, so that the EMEA operates in fact as if it were
largely independent. Whereas the member states have formally retained the right
to block any unwanted authorization decision, they donot use this right in practice.
The almost complete absence of political intervention by the member states is dif-
ficult to explain by the authorization procedure alone, because this institutional
arrangement lacks a device that could effectively hinder them from doing so. To
assume that the member states simply do not want to interfere with the scientific
authorization process begs the question of why they should behave systematically
differently in other areas of European integration, where bargaining prevails, and
even from their former behaviour concerning the authorization of pharmaceuticals,
where the original procedure of mutual recognition did not work at all.
3.2 The second layer: substantive decision criteria and judicial oversight
Legally binding criteria for decision-making provide the foundation of another
layer of the oversight mechanism. Acting as the European legislator, Commis-
sion, Council and Parliament have jointly enacted a large set of substantive cri-
teria which are legally binding for all actors involved. Basic criteria are provided
for in Council Regulation No. 2309/93 (replaced by Regulation [EC] 726/
2004) establishing the EMEA and the centralized authorization procedure.
Authorization decisions shall exclusively rely on the evaluation of the safety, effi-
cacy and quality of a pharmaceutical – aside from narrowly defined exceptions
to meet moral concerns (e.g. Irish concerns about pharmaceuticals for abortion).
The broad criteria are specified by a detailed ‘Community Code Relating to
Medicinal Products for Human Use’ now enshrined in Directive 2001/83/
EC (OJ L 311 of 28.11.2001: 67). Apart from fundamental definitions and
some procedural rules, this code provides detailed standards for the medical
tests to be passed by every pharmaceutical in order to obtain reliable data for
its appraisal. Non-scientific factors like the economic well-being of the pharma-
ceutical industry or financial constraints of domestic healthcare systems shall be
ignored. Occasional criticism of the EMEA for not founding its opinions on
additional criteria such as general aspects of public health or for accepting
‘me too’ drugs with therapies for which pharmaceuticals already exist
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(Abraham and Lewis 2002; Permanand and Mossialos 2005) is thus implicitly
directed at enlarging the discretion enjoyed by the agency.
The European courts join the ‘authorization game’ and will eventually decide
on whether standards have been correctly applied or not. The relevance of
European law and European courts for the authorization system for pharmaceu-
ticals became evident in a judicial struggle about the authorization of anorectics,
i.e. medicinal products against obesity. In 2000, the Commission withdrew
market authorizations for an old group of these pharmaceuticals, which had
been granted long before the establishment of the centralized authorization
system by national authorization agencies (Decisions: C [2000] 452, C
[2000] 453 and C [2000] 608). The EMEA expert committee had originally
recommended prolonging authorization of these pharmaceuticals under specific
conditions, but modified its appraisal later. The producers took the matter to
the European Court of First Instance, which rejected the joint positions of
the Commission and the expert committee (joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00,
T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, 26.11.2002),
because they relied exclusively on a modified appraisal of the safety and efficacy
of the pharmaceuticals in question, and not on new scientific insights. Remark-
ably, the court examined the merits of the scientific opinion elaborated by the
expert committee in great detail and delved into the substance of the authoriz-
ation decision. Upon appeal by the Commission, the judgment was confirmed
by the European Court of Justice (case C-39/03 P, 24.6.2003).
Access to judicial oversight is somewhat biased toward challenging negative
authorization decisions. Generally, a private plaintiff can only bring a claim suc-
cessfully to the European courts if he is directly and individually concerned by a
Community action (Art. 230, formerly 173, of the EC Treaty). An applicant
can easily demonstrate such concern because the relevant decision is directly
addressed at him. He will be entitled to market a medicinal product if the cri-
teria of safety, efficacy and quality are met (Collatz 1996: 134). In contrast,
direct concern is difficult to prove for consumers or physicians, i.e. the immedi-
ate or indirect users of authorized pharmaceuticals, because they are usually not
individually affected by an authorization decision. In a recent case, the European
Court of First Instance denied the legal standing of an employee, who had been
responsible for testing a pharmaceutical, because she was not individually and
directly affected by the positive authorization decision (case T-326/99,
18.12.2003). Consequently, it is much easier for producers to take legal
action against a badly reasoned negative authorization decision than for consu-
mers to challenge an unconvincing positive decision. However, a member state
might step in if it considers a positive decision to be scientifically unwarranted,
because member states always enjoy legal standing.
The existence of substantive decision-making criteria and their supervision by
the European courts are intended to guide the EMEA expert committee and
limit its discretion. Legally binding substantive decision criteria provide a
yardstick against which its opinions can be appraised and, if appropriate, chal-
lenged through judicial review instigated by states and non-state actors with
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legal standing. Moreover, an EMEA opinion not conforming to the binding
substantive standards could also be challenged by the Commission and/or the
Standing Committee in the later stages of the authorization procedure (see
section 3.1). Hence, this arrangement is to provide an additional incentive for
the EMEA expert committee to stick to its mandate – fully in line with the
general concern of the principal–agent literature, that regulatory agencies
must be hindered from shirking.
However, substantive decision criteria and their judicial supervision also limit
the room for manoeuvre of the non-scientific actors involved in the European
authorization of pharmaceuticals, namely the Commission and the Standing
Committee representing the member states. Their action can also be appraised
against the legally binding yardstick. Since applicants may take legal action, it is
hardly conceivable that these actors deviate from a scientifically sound opinion
of the expert committee without eventually being called back by the European
courts. Accordingly, their action under the authorization procedure is effectively
restricted to tacit oversight of whether the criteria are sincerely applied by the
agency. Moreover, when elaborating the substantive criteria in their capacity
as the European legislator, Commission, Council and the European Parliament
are jointly forced to mould general rules applicable to an unknown number of
future cases. Thereby, the principals are hindered from accounting for parochial
interests in specific cases, because they are bound to devise a single set of substan-
tive rules applicable to all future cases alike. Accordingly, capture by parochial
interests becomes less likely (Gehring 2004: 689–90).
As a result, the authorization process is not integrated by the bargaining
power of non-scientific actors any more, but by scientific reasoning within
the limits of mandatory European law (see also Joerges and Neyer 1997).
Legally enforceable substantive decision criteria increase the power of the scien-
tific expert committee vis-a`-vis the non-scientific actors, as long as it sticks to its
mandate. They can be exploited best by the actors who are specialized in scien-
tific expertise, whereas they deprive the non-scientific actors of their bargaining
power. Thus, the effects of the second layer of oversight contribute to explaining
the remarkable inactivity of the Commission and the Standing Committee
under the authorization procedure observed in the preceding section.
3.3 The third layer: internal oversight through EMEA standards
A third layer of oversight arrangements is provided by internal EMEA standards
which limit the discretion of the expert committee and reduce the uncertainty of
applicants about the expected content of future authorization decisions. In spite
of its detailed provisions, the legally binding substantive criteria for the assess-
ment of the safety, efficacy and quality of pharmaceuticals do not fully
abolish the discretion of the expert committee. This is especially due to the
fact that authorization decisions always involve a trade-off between safety and
efficacy. The more effective a product is, the more undesired side-effects it
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will generally cause (Heilmann 2002), and there will frequently be a range of
possible ways of weighing effects against side-effects.
The authorization process is guided by a great number of internal standards
of different types. They are far more detailed than the legally binding Commu-
nity Code for Medicinal Products for Human Use. These standards constitute
the principal instrument of the EMEA to inform possible applicants of the
precise criteria upon which its scientific opinions are based (interviews at
EMEA headquarters and at the German pharmaceutical authority [Bundesamt
fu¨r Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte]). They are elaborated by various
working groups of the expert committee or emerge from the international con-
ference on harmonization (ICH) founded by the United States, Japan and the
EU to harmonize their national (or supranational) authorization of medicinal
products (Vogel 1998). As of 1 June 2003, 146 Guidelines were in force,
while twenty-four were in a draft stage, and twenty-three in the preceding
conceptual stage. These documents reflect the position of the expert committee
concerning areas of reliable scientific knowledge and experience. Moreover,
twenty-four ‘Points to Consider’ documents had been adopted, while five
were in the draft stage and nine more in the conceptual stage. In contrast to
Guidelines, they address areas of pharmaceutical research and regulation in
which considerable scientific uncertainty prevails. In addition, numerous
Position Papers, Statements and other documents of inferior status were
adopted or were in draft stages (see Krapohl 2005: 133–46).
Despite their informal status, these rules create a significant binding force on
the expert committee because they cannot be ignored or changed at will. They
are not legally binding and cannot be directly enforced by judicial review,
because the task of rule-making is not formally assigned to the agency.
However, they might well be used in legal proceedings as an indication of the
state of the art of pharmaceutical research and experience. Authorization
decisions that deviate from these rules will thus require particularly convincing
justification. This is all the more true because Guidelines as the most reliable
guidance documents are not only published by the EMEA, but also by the Com-
mission (see Medicinal Products for Human Use: Guidelines, in EudraLex: The
Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union, Vol. 3). Like
Points to Consider documents, they are developed in a formal administrative
procedure, which includes publication of drafts and the consultation of stake-
holders, such as pharmaceutical companies, consumer groups and the authoriz-
ation bodies of the member states (see Standing Operating Procedure for
Developing CPMP Guidelines and Points to Consider Documents;
CPMP/2024/98).
Instead of exploiting its informally powerful status under the authorization
procedure, the EMEA expert committee limits its margins of discrete choice
through the elaboration and publication of numerous guidance documents.
In its own interest of developing, and subsequently preserving, the reputation
of producing scientifically convincing opinions, the agency chooses to volunta-
rily bind itself at the mast of institutional rules in order to enhance the
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credibility of its decisions. By committing itself to decisions that follow its own
rules, the committee reduces the number of options that could be chosen and
voluntarily cuts the room for manoeuvre for internal bargaining. Thus, it
creates a strong incentive for deliberation about the appropriate application of
legally binding and non-binding criteria (on the difference between bargaining
and reason-based deliberation, see Elster 1998; Risse 2000). The output of a
rule-based decision-making system will be more coherent and less arbitrary
than decisions based upon ad hoc considerations.
4. CONCLUSION: SUPRANATIONAL REGULATION
THROUGH A COMPLEX REGULATORY SYSTEM
WITH A SEMI-INDEPENDENT AGENCY
The centralized authorization procedure for pharmaceuticals reflects a new
approach to governance in the single market. It is characterized by the involve-
ment of a strong regulatory agency as well as by the participation of a number of
other actors, including the Commission, the member states and the European
courts. In contrast to the comitology system existing in other fields of European
governance, it differs significantly through its high degree of legalization and
adjudication forcing all actors involved to accept guidance by legally binding
substantive decision criteria.
The EMEA can act like an independent regulatory agency, although it is not
formally independent. Its dominant position within the authorization process
does not originate from its formal status, because authorization decisions are
still formally adopted jointly by the Commission and the Standing Committee.
Instead, it is rooted in the restrictions imposed on the non-scientific actors by
the authorization system. These actors cannot exploit their formally strong pos-
ition at the end of the authorization procedure because they must observe a volu-
minous collection of substantive decision criteria, which may be legally enforced
by interested actors. This explains the observed inactivity of the Commission
and the Standing Committee. Hence, restrictions preventing other actors
from intervening in the day-to-day business of the agency operate as a functional
equivalent to the agency’s formal independence. We might conclude that
measured degrees of independence of regulatory agencies to be found in the
principal–agent literature (Gilardi 2002) do not necessarily correlate with the
ability of these agencies to act independently.
In spite of actual non-interference of non-scientific actors in the day-to-day
operation of the EMEA, the agency does not operate in the absence of effective
oversight mechanisms. On the one hand, the authorization procedure includes a
powerful fire alarm mechanism. If stakeholders or an outvoted member of the
expert committee alert the Commission and/or the member states, EMEA
opinions can easily be prevented from becoming legally binding authorization
decisions. Hence, the Commission and the Standing Committee representing
the member states fulfil an important oversight function, even if not becoming
active, because they create an incentive for the EMEA to produce scientifically
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convincing opinions. On the other hand, the EMEA is, like all other actors
involved, legally bound to observe the voluminous set of substantive decision
criteria, which may be enforced by states and non-state actors with legal stand-
ing. The possibility for applicants to take legal action and the preparedness of
the European courts to examine the merits of disputed opinions provide
another strong incentive for the EMEA to produce sound opinions. The
expert committee has responded to these incentives. The endeavour of the
EMEA to elaborate numerous additional guidance documents contributes to
avoiding arbitrary or unconvincing decisions which might undermine its
reputation as a sound regulator and lead to the intervention of non-scientific
actors. Thus, the expert committee limits its own discretion and successfully
sidesteps the internal credible commitment problem which might arise from
the fact that its members implicitly represent their domestic authorization
agencies.
Instead of merely reallocating the decision-making power among the actors
involved, the centralized authorization procedure establishes a regulatory
system which submits all relevant actors alike to severe constraints and limits
their room for discrete choice. It operates under the implicit assumption that
the authorization of pharmaceuticals is, in essence, about the search for the
most convincing decisions, not about discrete choice which characterizes redis-
tributive decisions (Majone 1996: 28–47). The system limits the discretion of
the agency which is induced to concentrate on its area of primary competence,
namely scientific and regulatory expertise. It has to ignore all other aspects that
might possibly affect the appraisal of an application, because its decisions may be
appraised against substantive criteria. However, the rules also limit the discre-
tion of all other relevant actors and thus shield the agency from outside pressure.
The formally powerful oversight actors, i.e. Commission and member states, are
deprived of their ability to mobilize non-scientific sources to influence author-
ization decisions, such as bargaining power and votes. And industry, although in
close contact with the agency during pre-application and application stages, will
hardly be able to influence the decision process except through information and
convincing arguments based upon the substantive criteria. Thus, the system is
designed to protect the decision-making process against particularistic interests,
although it does note exclude actors with particularistic interests from partici-
pating in this process in specific functions.
The particular balance between autonomy and control reflected within the
European centralized authorization procedure for pharmaceuticals is not fully
grasped by any of the current theoretical approaches to delegation and agency
decision-making. It reflects neither of the ‘two logics of delegation’ discussed
by Majone (2001a). Neither the agent, nor the principals, i.e. the Council in
collaboration with the Commission and the European Parliament acting as
the joint European legislator, dispose of far-reaching discretion within the
procedure. The institutional arrangement is also not easily accommodated
with the alleged divide between industrialists on the one side and domestic
licensing authorities as well as consumerists on the other side (Lewis and
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Abraham 2001; Permanand and Mossialos 2005). While it has been created as a
market-making project and producers play an important role as applicants and
as possible litigants, it is difficult to see how industry could dominate the auth-
orization process. The licensing authorities, i.e. the domestic guardians of public
health, are heavily involved in the elaboration of scientific opinions, but they are
forced to adhere to legally binding standards and to agree on the common
appraisal of every single product so that national idiosyncrasies are effectively
filtered out. Rather than assigning unbound discretion to any of these actors,
the system mobilizes the resources of all actors involved, whether private or
public, member state or European, and drags them into common problem-
solving in light of generalized substantive decision criteria.
Biographical notes: Thomas Gehring is Professor of International Politics in
the Department of Social and Economic Sciences at Otto Friedrich University,
Bamberg, Germany. Sebastian Krapohl is PhD candidate in the Department
of Social and Economic Sciences at Otto Friedrich University, Bamberg,
Germany.
Addresses for correspondence: Thomas Gehring, Department of Social
and Economic Sciences, Otto Friedrich University, Bamberg, Feldkirchenstr.
21, 96045 Bamberg, Germany. email: thomas.gehring@sowi.uni-bamberg.
de/Sebastian Krapohl, Department of Social and Economic Sciences,
Otto Friedrich University, Bamberg, Feldkirchenstr. 21, 96045 Bamberg,
Germany. email: sebastian.krapohl@sowi.uni-bamberg.de
REFERENCES
Abraham, J. and Lewis, G. (2000) Regulating Medicines in Europe: Competition, Exper-
tise and Public Health, London: Routledge.
Abraham, J. and Lewis, G. (2002) ‘Citizenship, medical expertise and the capitalist
regulatory state in Europe’, Sociology 36(1): 67–88.
Alter, K. J. (1998) ‘Who are the “masters of the Treaty”? European governments and the
European Court of Justice’, International Organization 52(1): 121–47.
Cameron McKenna and Anderson Consulting (2001) Evaluation of the Operation of
Community Procedures for the Authorisation of Medicinal Products, http://pharmacos.
eudra.org/F2/review/index.htm.
Collatz, B. (1996)Die neuen europa¨ischen Zulassungsverfahren fu¨r Arzneimittel: Insbeson-
dere Verfahren und Rechtsschutz des Antragstellers und Zulassungsinhabers bei Zulas-
sungsentscheidungen, Aulendorf: Editio Cantor.
Cukierman, A. (1994) ‘Commitment through delegation. Political influence and
central bank independence’, in J.O. de Beauford Wijnholds, S.C.W. Eijffinger
and L.H. Hoogduin (eds), A Framework for Monetary Stability, Dordrecht:
Kluwer, pp. 55–74.
Dehousse, R. (1997) ‘Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of
European agencies’, Journal of European Public Policy 4(2): 246–61.
Eberlein, B. and Grande, E. (2005) ‘Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory
regimes and the EU regulatory state’, Journal of European Public Policy 12(1):
89–112.
224 Journal of European Public Policy
Elster, J. (1998) ‘Deliberation and constitution making’, in J. Elster (ed.), Deliberative
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 97–122.
Feick, J. (2000) ‘Marktzugangsregulierung: Nationale Regulierung, europa¨ische
Integration und internationale Harmonisierung in der Arzneimittelzulassung’, in
R. Czada and S. Lu¨tz (eds), Die politische Konstitution von Ma¨rkten, Wiesbaden:
Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 228–49.
Feick, J. (2005) Learning and Interest Accommodation in Policy and Institutional Change:
EC Risk Regulation in the Pharmaceuticals Sector, Discussion Paper No. 25, London:
London School of Economics, Centre of Analysis of Risk and Regulation.
Franchino, F. (2002) ‘Efficiency or credibility? Testing the two logics of delegation to
the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy 9(5): 677–94.
Gardner, J.S. (1996) ‘The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicines and
European regulation of pharmaceuticals’, European Law Journal 2(1): 48–82.
Gehring, T. (2004) ‘The consequences of delegation to independent agencies: separ-
ation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of telecommunications
in Germany’, European Journal of Political Research 43(4): 677–98.
Gilardi, F. (2002) ‘Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies:
a comparative empirical analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 873–93.
Heilmann, K. (2002) ‘Risiko und Sicherheit’, Deutsche Apotheker Zeitung 142(11):
85–93.
Huber, J.D. (2000) ‘Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies’,
European Journal of Political Research 37(3): 397–413.
Huber, J.D., Shipan, C.R. and Pfuhler, M. (2001) ‘Legislatures and statutory control of
bureaucracy’, American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 330–45.
Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (1997) ‘Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative
problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector’, Journal of European
Public Policy 4(4): 609–25.
Keech, W.R. (1995) Economic Policy: The Costs of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kelemen, D.R. (2002) ‘The politics of “Eurocratic” structure and the new European
agencies’, West European Politics 25(4): 93–118.
Kiewiet, R. and McCubbins, M.D. (1991) The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties
and the Appropriations Process, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Krapohl, S. (2003) ‘Risk regulation in the EU between interests and expertise: the case
of BSE’, Journal of European Public Policy 10(2): 189–207.
Krapohl, S. (2004) ‘Credible commitment in non-independent regulatory agencies: a
comparative analysis of the European agencies for foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals’,
European Law Journal 10(5): 518–38.
Krapohl, S. (2005) ‘Die europa¨ische Arzneimittelzulassung’, in T. Gehring, S. Krapohl,
M. Kerler and S. Stefanova (eds), Rationalita¨t durch Verfahren in der Europa¨ischen
Union: Europa¨ische Arzneimittelzulassung und Normung technischer Gu¨ter, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, pp. 81–196.
Lewis, G. and Abraham, J. (2001) ‘The creation of neo-liberal corporate bias in trans-
national medicines control: the industrial shaping and interest dynamics of the
European regulatory state’, European Journal of Political Research 39(1): 53–80.
Majone, G. (1996) Regulating Europe, London: Routledge.
Majone, G. (1997) ‘The new European agencies: regulation by information’, Journal of
European Public Policy 4(2): 262–75.
Majone, G. (2001a) ‘Two logics of delegation: agency and fiduciary relations in EU
governance’, European Union Politics 2(1): 103–21.
Majone, G. (2001b) ‘Nonmajoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic govern-
ance: a political transaction-cost approach’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Politics 157: 57–78.
T. Gehring & S. Krapohl: EMEA and pharmaceuticals in the Single Market 225
Majone, G. and Everson, M. (2001) ‘Institutional reform: independent agencies, over-
sight, coordination and procedural control’, in O. de Schutter, M. Lebessis and
J. Paterson (eds), Governance in the European Union, Luxembourg: European
Union, pp. 129–68.
McCubbins, M.D. and Schwartz, T. (1987) ‘Congressional oversight overlooked:
police patrol versus fire alarms’, American Journal of Political Science 28(1): 165–79.
McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R.G. and Weingast, B.R. (1987) ‘Administrative procedures
as instruments of political control’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
3(2): 243–77.
Permanand, G. and Mossialos, E. (2005) ‘Constitutional asymmetry and pharma-
ceutical policy-making in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy
12(4): 687–709.
Pollack, M.A. (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and
Agenda-Setting in the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Risse, T. (2000) ‘“Let’s Argue!” Communicative action in world politics’, International
Organization 54(1): 1–39.
Shapiro, M. (1988) Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration,
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
Shapiro, M. (1992) ‘The giving-reasons requirement’, University of Chicago Legal
Forum, pp. 180–220.
Shepsle, K.A. (1991) ‘Discretion, institutions, and the problem of government
commitment’, in P. Bourdieu and J.S. Coleman (eds), Social Theory for a Changing
Society, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 245–63.
Tallberg, J. (2002) ‘Delegation to supranational institutions: why, how and with what
consequences’, West European Politics 25(1): 23–46.
Thatcher, M. (2002) ‘Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in
Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 9(6): 954–72.
Tsebelis, G. (1994) ‘The power of the European Parliament as a conditional agenda-
setter’, American Political Science Review 88(1): 128–42.
Vogel, D. (1998) ‘The globalization of pharmaceutical regulation’, Governance: An
International Journal of Policy and Administration 11(1): 1–22.
Vos, E. (1999) Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Legislation:
Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies, Oxford: Hart.
Final version accepted for publication 12/06/06
226 Journal of European Public Policy
